Navigating China and the Global South: a conversation with Eric Olander
Mon Dec 15 2025
Eric Olander, Editor-in-Chief of the China Global South Project, offers a nuanced perspective on China’s engagement with developing countries across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Pacific. Drawing on 40 years of experience as a journalist covering China, including stints at the BBC, Associated Press and CNN, Olander challenges dominant Western narratives about Chinese development finance, including the much-discussed “debt trap” thesis. He examines the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative toward “small yet beautiful” projects, explores how developing countries are exercising agency in navigating great power competition, and discusses China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture. In a frank assessment of China’s presence in the Pacific Islands, Olander argues that Australian anxieties about military threats are disproportionate to actual Chinese capabilities, while suggesting pathways for more constructive engagement between Western donors and China in development cooperation.
The conversation begins with Olander’s journey to covering China, having started studying Chinese in 1985 as a teenager in California when China was still poorer than most African countries. His career progressed through internships at radio stations in Taiwan and Hong Kong to positions at the BBC, Associated Press in Beijing, and CNN. It was during travels to Africa from the mid-2000s that he witnessed the explosive growth of Chinese presence — from one Chinese restaurant in Kinshasa in 2005 to a boom of construction crews, Huawei signs and Chinese enterprises by 2009. When he asked his Congolese employees what they thought of China, their nuanced, complex answers contrasted sharply with the polarised narratives in Western and Chinese media, sparking the insight that would eventually become the China Global South Project.
The China Global South Project, which evolved from the China Africa Project, operates as an independent, non-partisan research and analysis service serving governments, universities and corporations across 15 to 20 countries. Funded through a mix of grants, university partnerships and subscriptions, the project maintains strict editorial independence — a stance that regularly draws accusations of being both a CIA spy and a CCP shill, sometimes within the same week. Olander notes that the project has faced sophisticated cyberattacks and has been targeted by Chinese state media, reflecting the sensitive nature of coverage that refuses to adopt binary positions on China.
On the much-debated “debt trap diplomacy” thesis, Olander presents a detailed rebuttal drawing on research from institutions including Boston University, Johns Hopkins, Chatham House and the AidData Institute at William and Mary College. He argues that the narrative, first proposed by Indian pundit Brahma Chellaney in 2017, does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Chinese loans to Africa at their peak represented only 18% of the continent’s debt, concentrated mostly in five countries with Angola alone accounting for a third. More importantly, Olander contends that the Chinese were never seeking assets — as Western imperial powers historically did — but rather repayment and cash. The infamous Hambantota port case in Sri Lanka, he explains, resulted from the incompetence and corruption of the Rajapaksa family rather than Chinese asset seizure, with the 99-year lease arising because the Chinese had no interest in taking back the port and pushed for a solution to recover their investment.
The interview explores the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative from massive infrastructure lending to “small yet beautiful” projects. Olander identifies four key drivers of this transition: China’s reduced excess capital due to slower economic growth and domestic debt problems; domestic political pushback against large overseas expenditures; borrower countries’ reduced capacity to take on debt following the pandemic; and Beijing’s shift toward private sector and provincial-level engagement rather than central government lending. The Belt and Road’s deliberate lack of institutional structure — no secretariat, no headquarters — has proven to be a feature rather than a bug, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances.
Challenging another common assumption, Olander argues that developing countries exercise considerable agency in navigating great power competition rather than being passive victims buffeted by China-West rivalry. He points to Kenya’s success under President Uhuru Kenyatta in maintaining robust relations with both China and the West, becoming a non-NATO major ally while hosting major Chinese infrastructure projects. Cambodia under Hun Manet represents an even more surprising example, pivoting away from his father Hun Sen’s China-heavy approach to welcome US naval vessels at Chinese-built ports while maintaining engagement with Beijing. Countries like Vietnam have mastered “bamboo diplomacy” — being an enemy to none and a friend to all — a model now emulated across ASEAN.
On technology and manufacturing, Olander presents a sobering assessment of China’s dominance. Chinese investment in critical minerals, electric vehicles and new energy represents a 10-15 year head start that Western countries may not be able to overcome. The refining of critical minerals — the most complex and polluting part of the supply chain — is concentrated in China, which has paid an enormous environmental price for this capacity. Chinese electric vehicles entering markets at prices US$20,000 below competitors pose an existential threat to Western automakers, with one Vietnamese analyst predicting Ford, Toyota and Kia will be essentially eliminated from the market within five years. For developing countries, Olander raises provocative questions about whether aspiring to critical mineral processing makes sense given the high environmental costs and limited job creation.
Regarding the Pacific Islands, Olander offers a frank assessment that Australian anxieties about Chinese military threats are disproportionate to reality. China lacks the command and control capacity, resupply ships and logistical network to project force this far south — its military is focused on the first and second island chains in the South and East China Seas. Chinese naval exercises near Australia are better understood as signalling — a message that if Australia operates in the South China Sea, China can reciprocate — rather than evidence of genuine invasion capability. The more significant Chinese interest in the Pacific stems from Taiwan diplomacy, as three Pacific Island states still recognise Taipei. Olander argues that China took advantage of a period when Australia, New Zealand and the United States neglected the region, and that more sustained Western engagement, as pursued by Foreign Minister Penny Wong, reduces the incentive for Pacific nations to turn to Beijing.
The conversation examines China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and what Olander calls the “Five Gs”: the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative, Global AI Initiative, and most recently the Global Governance Initiative. While dismissing BRICS as essentially a “grievance forum”, Olander argues that grievance is itself a powerful political force that should not be underestimated — the same force that propelled Donald Trump to power. When Chinese ambassadors can offer developing country leaders participation in multiple new international frameworks while Western ambassadors speak only of preserving the “rules-based international order”, China’s forward-looking pitch proves more appealing.
Olander concludes with advice for Western donors seeking constructive engagement with China. He suggests that Australia find neutral ground — perhaps in Africa or Latin America — to develop working relationships and interoperability with Chinese development actors before attempting cooperation in contested spaces like the Pacific. Drawing on the French model of partnership with China on infrastructure projects in the Global South, he argues that middle powers like Australia and Canada need to develop alternatives to pure reliance on increasingly unpredictable US leadership. The key is to build experience in low-stakes environments where mutual suspicions are less acute, then gradually work toward collaboration in more sensitive regions.
Links:
Eric Olander delivers the Mitchell Oration at the 2025 Australasian AID Conference (Devpolicy YouTube)
China Global South Project
The China in Africa Podcast (Apple Podcasts)
Global Public Diplomacy Dashboard by AidData China
Boston University Global Development Policy Center
China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAIS
Griffith Asia Institute Belt and Road Tracker
Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre.
Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org.
Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au.
Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events.
You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.
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Eric Olander, Editor-in-Chief of the China Global South Project, offers a nuanced perspective on China’s engagement with developing countries across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Pacific. Drawing on 40 years of experience as a journalist covering China, including stints at the BBC, Associated Press and CNN, Olander challenges dominant Western narratives about Chinese development finance, including the much-discussed “debt trap” thesis. He examines the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative toward “small yet beautiful” projects, explores how developing countries are exercising agency in navigating great power competition, and discusses China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture. In a frank assessment of China’s presence in the Pacific Islands, Olander argues that Australian anxieties about military threats are disproportionate to actual Chinese capabilities, while suggesting pathways for more constructive engagement between Western donors and China in development cooperation. The conversation begins with Olander’s journey to covering China, having started studying Chinese in 1985 as a teenager in California when China was still poorer than most African countries. His career progressed through internships at radio stations in Taiwan and Hong Kong to positions at the BBC, Associated Press in Beijing, and CNN. It was during travels to Africa from the mid-2000s that he witnessed the explosive growth of Chinese presence — from one Chinese restaurant in Kinshasa in 2005 to a boom of construction crews, Huawei signs and Chinese enterprises by 2009. When he asked his Congolese employees what they thought of China, their nuanced, complex answers contrasted sharply with the polarised narratives in Western and Chinese media, sparking the insight that would eventually become the China Global South Project. The China Global South Project, which evolved from the China Africa Project, operates as an independent, non-partisan research and analysis service serving governments, universities and corporations across 15 to 20 countries. Funded through a mix of grants, university partnerships and subscriptions, the project maintains strict editorial independence — a stance that regularly draws accusations of being both a CIA spy and a CCP shill, sometimes within the same week. Olander notes that the project has faced sophisticated cyberattacks and has been targeted by Chinese state media, reflecting the sensitive nature of coverage that refuses to adopt binary positions on China. On the much-debated “debt trap diplomacy” thesis, Olander presents a detailed rebuttal drawing on research from institutions including Boston University, Johns Hopkins, Chatham House and the AidData Institute at William and Mary College. He argues that the narrative, first proposed by Indian pundit Brahma Chellaney in 2017, does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Chinese loans to Africa at their peak represented only 18% of the continent’s debt, concentrated mostly in five countries with Angola alone accounting for a third. More importantly, Olander contends that the Chinese were never seeking assets — as Western imperial powers historically did — but rather repayment and cash. The infamous Hambantota port case in Sri Lanka, he explains, resulted from the incompetence and corruption of the Rajapaksa family rather than Chinese asset seizure, with the 99-year lease arising because the Chinese had no interest in taking back the port and pushed for a solution to recover their investment. The interview explores the evolution of the Belt and Road Initiative from massive infrastructure lending to “small yet beautiful” projects. Olander identifies four key drivers of this transition: China’s reduced excess capital due to slower economic growth and domestic debt problems; domestic political pushback against large overseas expenditures; borrower countries’ reduced capacity to take on debt following the pandemic; and Beijing’s shift toward private sector and provincial-level engagement rather than central government lending. The Belt and Road’s deliberate lack of institutional structure — no secretariat, no headquarters — has proven to be a feature rather than a bug, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances. Challenging another common assumption, Olander argues that developing countries exercise considerable agency in navigating great power competition rather than being passive victims buffeted by China-West rivalry. He points to Kenya’s success under President Uhuru Kenyatta in maintaining robust relations with both China and the West, becoming a non-NATO major ally while hosting major Chinese infrastructure projects. Cambodia under Hun Manet represents an even more surprising example, pivoting away from his father Hun Sen’s China-heavy approach to welcome US naval vessels at Chinese-built ports while maintaining engagement with Beijing. Countries like Vietnam have mastered “bamboo diplomacy” — being an enemy to none and a friend to all — a model now emulated across ASEAN. On technology and manufacturing, Olander presents a sobering assessment of China’s dominance. Chinese investment in critical minerals, electric vehicles and new energy represents a 10-15 year head start that Western countries may not be able to overcome. The refining of critical minerals — the most complex and polluting part of the supply chain — is concentrated in China, which has paid an enormous environmental price for this capacity. Chinese electric vehicles entering markets at prices US$20,000 below competitors pose an existential threat to Western automakers, with one Vietnamese analyst predicting Ford, Toyota and Kia will be essentially eliminated from the market within five years. For developing countries, Olander raises provocative questions about whether aspiring to critical mineral processing makes sense given the high environmental costs and limited job creation. Regarding the Pacific Islands, Olander offers a frank assessment that Australian anxieties about Chinese military threats are disproportionate to reality. China lacks the command and control capacity, resupply ships and logistical network to project force this far south — its military is focused on the first and second island chains in the South and East China Seas. Chinese naval exercises near Australia are better understood as signalling — a message that if Australia operates in the South China Sea, China can reciprocate — rather than evidence of genuine invasion capability. The more significant Chinese interest in the Pacific stems from Taiwan diplomacy, as three Pacific Island states still recognise Taipei. Olander argues that China took advantage of a period when Australia, New Zealand and the United States neglected the region, and that more sustained Western engagement, as pursued by Foreign Minister Penny Wong, reduces the incentive for Pacific nations to turn to Beijing. The conversation examines China’s construction of a parallel international governance architecture, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and what Olander calls the “Five Gs”: the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative, Global AI Initiative, and most recently the Global Governance Initiative. While dismissing BRICS as essentially a “grievance forum”, Olander argues that grievance is itself a powerful political force that should not be underestimated — the same force that propelled Donald Trump to power. When Chinese ambassadors can offer developing country leaders participation in multiple new international frameworks while Western ambassadors speak only of preserving the “rules-based international order”, China’s forward-looking pitch proves more appealing. Olander concludes with advice for Western donors seeking constructive engagement with China. He suggests that Australia find neutral ground — perhaps in Africa or Latin America — to develop working relationships and interoperability with Chinese development actors before attempting cooperation in contested spaces like the Pacific. Drawing on the French model of partnership with China on infrastructure projects in the Global South, he argues that middle powers like Australia and Canada need to develop alternatives to pure reliance on increasingly unpredictable US leadership. The key is to build experience in low-stakes environments where mutual suspicions are less acute, then gradually work toward collaboration in more sensitive regions. Links: Eric Olander delivers the Mitchell Oration at the 2025 Australasian AID Conference (Devpolicy YouTube) China Global South Project The China in Africa Podcast (Apple Podcasts) Global Public Diplomacy Dashboard by AidData China Boston University Global Development Policy Center China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAIS Griffith Asia Institute Belt and Road Tracker Devpolicy Talks is the podcast of the Australian National University's Development Policy Centre. Read and subscribe to our daily blogs at devpolicy.org. Learn more about our research and join our public events at devpolicy.anu.edu.au. Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram for latest updates on our blogs, research and events. You can send us feedback, and ideas for episodes too, to devpolicy@anu.edu.au.